Bankruptcy Law

[11/20] Severo v. Comm'r of Int'l Rev.
In taxpayers' appeal of a tax court decision granting summary judgment for the IRS and permitting it to proceed with its collection action relating to petitioners' 1990 tax liability, the order is affirmed where the statute of limitations regarding collection was tolled during the pendency of petitioners' bankruptcy proceedings.

[11/18] Boyer v. Crown Stock Distrib., Inc.
In Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings in which the trustee filed an adversary action against the defendants claiming fraudulent conveyance under the section 4(a)(2) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, judgment in favor of the trustee is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in finding that the statutory condition for a fraudulent conveyance was satisfied; and 2) district court's ruling with respect to the dividend is reversed as the trustee is entitled to the dividend because it was an integral part of the leveraged buy-out.

[11/13] In re: Nowak
In Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) denial of plaintiff-creditor's motion to allow an informal proof of claim based on its prior filings as a putative secured creditor is affirmed as the BAP did not abuse its discretion in finding that: 1) plaintiff had ample notice of the likelihood that it would lose its status as a secured creditor, necessitating the filing of a proof of claim; 2) plaintiff's unexplained delay weighed against allowing plaintiff's informal proof of claim; and 3) the large dilution in the distribution to other creditors in this case was an appropriate consideration weighing against allowing plaintiff's claim.

[11/12] In re: Bradley
In bankruptcy trustee's appeal from a ruling of the bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, holding the trustee's predecessor in contempt of court and imposing monetary sanctions, the order is affirmed where: 1) the remedial civil contempt power extends to defiance of a bankruptcy court injunction whose terms are known, but which has not yet been formalized as required by procedural rules; and 2) the lack of agreement between the opposing parties briefing the motion for injunction did not render the resulting ruling unclear.

[11/12] In re: Madera
In debtors' bankruptcy proceedings for defaulting on their loan, ruling upholding the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the creditors and its denial of debtors' motion to amend is affirmed where: 1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over debtors' rescission claim because that claim was inextricably intertwined with a Court of Common Pleas' foreclosure judgment; 2) there was an adequate basis for summary judgment on the Truth in Lending Act damages claim, specifically, that debtors failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they had prior title insurance in connection with the loan; and 3) the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying debtor's motion to amend as it was untimely.

[11/06] In re: Smith
Order of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversing an order of the Bankruptcy Court is affirmed as a late alimony payment penalty was not a domestic support obligation, and as such, the ex-wife's claim was a general unsecured claim not entitled to priority status and consequently dischargeable.

[11/05] In re: Bender
In a bankruptcy adversary action seeking avoidance of the transfer of a parcel of real property from the debtor to defendant, defendant's appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (BAP) affirmance of the bankruptcy court's ruling that the doctrine of equitable tolling applied to the trustee's filing of the proceeding is dismissed where the BAP's order was nonfinal.

[11/05] Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.
In an appeal from the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order requiring a liquidating trust to pay post-petition attorneys' fees on a claim that stemmed from a pre-petition indemnity agreement, the judgment is affirmed where such claims are categorically allowable.

[11/03] In re: Paige
In an appeal from the bankruptcy court's decision confirming appellees' joint bankruptcy reorganization plan and denying appellants' competing plan, dismissal of the appeal as moot is reversed where: 1) the competing plan could theoretically be confirmed without requiring disgorgement of payments made to third-party creditors; and 2) reversal of the existing plan would not require the undoing of complex transactions.

[10/30] In the Matter of: Proeducation Int'l. Inc.
In an appeal from the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order disqualifying counsel for a creditor, the order is reversed where: 1) the bankruptcy court should have considered counsel's evidence of his lack of involvement with the debtor while at his prior law firm in making its decision; and 2) counsel presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he did not operate under a conflict of interest when he undertook the representation of creditor.

[10/28] In re: Riebesell
In a bankruptcy adversary proceeding seeking to prevent the discharge of a debt owed to plaintiff by his attorney (the debtor), judgment for plaintiff is affirmed where: 1) the parties had an attorney-client relationship during the relevant period under Colorado law; 2) the loans to defendant were not "standard commercial transactions" exempt from the requirements of Colo. R. Prof'l Conduct 1.8(a); and 3) the bankruptcy court's finding that defendant had the requisite intent to deceive plaintiff was not clearly erroneous.

[10/27] In the Matter of: Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc.
In an appeal from a district court order striking plaintiff's attorney as counsel of record and terminating his status as an appellant from a bankruptcy court order, the order is affirmed where: 1) counsel was not a licensed attorney; and 2) he lacked prudential standing to appeal from the bankruptcy court's order.

[10/15] In re: Reale
In bankruptcy trustee's action to recover money paid to a creditor, bankruptcy court's award of $20,000 preference recovery judgment against National Lumber is affirmed where: 1) a conclusion that the debtor exercised sufficient control over the funds at issue to demonstrate that they were an interest of the debtor in property is supported by the record; and 2) successor judge had no obligation to recall witnesses or to order a new trial.

[10/09] In re: Peaslee
In a debtor's appeal from a district court's order reversing the bankruptcy court's confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the district court's order is affirmed where the New York Court of Appeals held, in response to a certified question from the court of appeals, that negative equity on a trade-in vehicle is included in the purchase money security interest accompanying a new car's purchase and is therefore protected from cramdown by the Hanging Paragraph of Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code.

[10/08] In re: Simply Media, Inc.
In a case arising from bankruptcy proceedings involving fraudulent transfers, given the deficiencies of the present briefing, the appeal is dismissed and defendant's counsel ordered to show cause by written response as to why the court should not order payment by him personally of attorney's fees, double costs or both for a brief that renders the appeal frivolous.

[10/07] In re: Rose
In Mercantile National Bank of Indiana's claim under Indiana's Crime Victims' Compensation Act (CVCA) against debtor, which allows a person who suffers pecuniary loss as a result of certain property crimes to seek treble damages and attorneys' fees, district court's judgment affirming bankruptcy court's dismissal of the CVCA claim is reversed as Mercantile properly commenced its CVCA claim within the statute of limitations where it was not filed to enforce the previous judgment but rather to seek damages based on a new cause of action.

[10/05] In re: Greene
In debtor's appeal from the district court's order affirming a bankruptcy court's decision limiting the debtor's homestead exemption in his bankruptcy petition to $125,000 pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 522(p), the order is affirmed in part where no pre-petition appreciation of the property at issue occurred. However, the order is reversed in part where "any amount of interest that was acquired," as used in section 522(p)(1), meant the acquisition of ownership of real property and the monetary cap in section 522(p) did not apply to property to which a debtor acquired title more than 1215 days before she or he filed a bankruptcy petition.

[10/02] In re Greene
In a debtor's appeal from the bankruptcy court's order limiting the homestead exemption in his bankruptcy petition, the order is affirmed in part where there was no pre-petition appreciation of the property at issue; but reversed in part, where perfection of a homestead exemption does not constitute acquisition of a property interest for purposes of 11 U.S.C. section 522(p)(1), and thus the debtor's homestead was not subject to the $125,000 cap contained in section 522(p).

[10/02] Tam Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
In plaintiff-travel agencies' lawsuit under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act alleging a conspiracy to eliminate the practice of paying base commissions by various airlines, district court's dismissal of the amended complaint is affirmed, as the plaintiffs' claims against United Airlines were discharged in bankruptcy and the claims against the remaining defendants failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a prior illegal agreement.

[10/01] Orange Cty. Water Dist. v. Unocal Corp.
In a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's order denying petitioner's motion to remand the action to state court, the petition is denied where: 1) the court of appeals' prior opinion did not preclude the district court's conclusion that petitioners failed to file a timely motion for remand, because the purportedly erroneous removal under 28 U.S.C. section 1452(a) did not implicate the district court's subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) any challenge to the district court's subject matter jurisdiction was best addressed on direct appeal, rather than by a writ of mandamus.

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